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RECENT CASES
"CHILDREN BORN OF THE MARRIAGE"-
RES JUDICATA EFFECT ON LATER SUPPORT
PROCEEDINGS
L__A__ v. C.T J'1
In a divorce proceeding initiated by the wife (LAJ) in which the hus-
band (CTJ) was served by publication, the petitioner alleged that there
were three children "born of the marriage" and requested an award of
custody. The husband failed to enter an appearance and, on May 9, 1972,
the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri, entered a decree awarding
LAJ the divorce and custody of the three children. Neither child support
nor alimony could be obtained since the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the husband. Five years later, the wife brought an action
in the same court on an "Amended Motion for Order of Child Support."
The husband, personally served in this action, defended by denying pa-
ternity of one of the three children. At the evidentiary hearing on the
motion, an objection to cross-examination of the wife was sustained on
the ground that the divorce decree's recital that the children were "born
of the marriage" made the issue of paternity res judicata. The trial court
made an award of child support, from which the defendant appealed on
two points: abuse of discretion in the amount of the support award, and
error in refusal to hear evidence on the issue of paternity.
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, found an abuse of
discretion in the amount of the support award, and reversed and remanded
the case for the taking of further evidence on the issue of the husband's
ability to pay.2 The court concluded that, because on remand it was
probable that the husband again would want to litigate the issue of pa-
ternity, it was necessary to decide the merits of his contention that the
trial court erred in its refusal to allow him to raise non-paternity of one
of the children as a defense. This point of error focused on whether the
divorce decree's recital that the children were "born of the marriage" was
res judicata as to their parentage.
1. 577 S.W.2d 151 (Mo. App., W.D. 1979).
2. Id. at 153-54. The trial court had awarded support totaling $7200 a year.
The only evidence presented concerning the father's ability to pay was his in-
come of $3600 from two years before and the fact he had an auto polishing busi-
ness, with no evidence given as to the business's assets. Although this was a court-
tried case, the judgment was reversed on the ground that it was against the weight
of the evidence.
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The divorce decree, based on constructive service, had been final for
five years. Although the court recognized that Missouri has a strong in-
terest in preserving the finality of judgments, the court also was faced with
the axiom that service by publication cannot support a money judgment,
which in this case would result from the support obligation attendant to
a finding of paternity.3 The court resolved this conflict in favor of the
husband. It recognized first that the husband, who had been served only
by publication in the divorce action, had no opportunity to litigate
the issue of paternity. Thus, the court held that he was not bound by the
recital in the divorce decree that the children were "born of the marriage"
and that he could defend in the subsequent support hearing by denying
the parentage of the child. 4
The holding of this case raises interesting new considerations in the
areas of the prosecution and defense of dissolution and support actions.
The case adds a new dimension to the paternity area, an area that, in
Missouri, unlike most other states,5 is not governed by statute but only by
3. The court wrote that it found itself faced with "a near irreconcilable
clash of classic principles-the inviolability of final judgments from all save direct
attack vis-a-vis the inviolability of individuals from judgments for the payment of
money rendered on something as tenuous as service by publication." Id. at 152.
4. Id. at 156.
5. Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,. and Virginia are the only states
that have no statutory schemes for establishing paternity. The remaining 46 states
all have paternity or filiation statutes which vary greatly in their provisions, espe-
cially as to who is authorized to bring the action and the period of time in which
the action can be brought. Ten of the states have adopted the Uniform Parent-
age (or Paternity) Act. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12 (1) (Supp. 1973); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.35.050-.100 (Supp. 1979); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-841 to -851 (1973);
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-701 to -715 (1962); CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 7000-7018 (West Supp.
1979) (Uniform Parentage Act); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1973)
(Uniform Parentage Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-160 (West Supp. 1979);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 501-524 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.011 (West
Supp. 1979); GA. CODE- ANN. § 74-202 (1973); HAW. I.V. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26
(1968) (Uniform Parentage Act); IDAHO CoDE § 7-1101 (1969); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
106 , §§ 51.60.1 (Smith-Hurd 1963); IND. CODE .aNN. §§ 31-6-6.1-1 to -19 (Burns
Supp. 1979); Iowa CODE §§ 675.7-.15 (1950); K1( .STAT. § 38-1101 (Supp. 1973);
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 406.011-.180 (1970) (Uniform Act on Paternity); ME. REv. STAT.
tit. 19, §§ 271-287 (1964) (Uniform Act on Paternity); MD. CODE ANN. art. 16,
§ 66A (1957); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12 (West 1970); MICH. COMP. LAs
ANN. § 722.714 (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.252-.30 (West 1971); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 93-9-1 to -49 (1972) (Uniform Law on Paternity); MONT. REV. CODES ANN.
§§ 61-301 to -334 (Supp. 1977) (Uniform Parentage Act); NEB. RIv. STAT. §§ 13-
101 to -116 (1943); NrV. r.V. STAT. §§ 126.080-.290 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 168-A:1 to :12 (Supp. 1973) (Uniform Act on Paternity); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
9:17-1 to -25 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-4-1 to -24 (1953); N.Y. JUD. LAW
§§ 511-518 (McKinney 1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-14 to -17 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (Supp. 1977) (Uniform Parentage Act); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. §§ 3111.01-.17 (Page 1972); OrLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 71-85 (West 1971); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 109.125-.235 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 15-8-1 to -19 (1956); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 25-8-8 to -43 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-223 to -229
(1974); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, §§ 13.01-.09 (Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 78-45a-1 to -17 (1953) (Uniform Act on Paternity); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 331 (1974); WASH. IEv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010-.905 (Supp. 1978) (Uni-
[Vol. 45
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the common law. L A.J__ establishes that in a dissolution action or
in a declaratory judgment action brought to adjudicate paternity, per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant husband or putative father must be
obtained. Without personal jurisdiction, the recital or finding of paternity
may be attacked by the defendant father in a subsequent support proceed-
ing. 6 This casenote will discuss situations in which parties to a dissolution
or paternity action may or may not be bound by the paternity finding.
Paternity is a fact question. Its resolution establishes a biological re-
lationship between father and child which in turn creates a legal relation-
ship. As one commentator has stated, "biological relationship is the test
that has been used . . . for the fixing of support and other familial ob-
ligations, and it is biological relationship that underlies and is traced
by legal relationship."7 The aspect of the legal relationship that the
L__A J_ court focused upon was that of support. Because the estab-
lishment of a legal relationship leads to ensuing support obligations, the
L__A .J_ court concluded that the proceeding which establishes the
biological relationship, paternity, must be based on personal jurisdiction.8
The court found authority for this conclusion in T.J.K. v. N.B.9 That
form Parentage Act); W. VA. CODE §§ 48-7-1 to -4 (1966); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§
52.21-.25 (West 1957); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -117 (1977). For a discussion of
Missouri decisional law on paternity, see notes 39 & 40 and accompanying text infra.
6. The holding in L__A____ does not affect the court's power to award
custody of a child when there has been service only by publication. 577 S.W.2d
at 155. A distinction must be made between the determination of the custody of
a child as opposed to a determination of the paternity of a child.
Rights and duties of parties relative to a res can be determined in an action
in which jurisdiction is obtained pursuant to service by publication. Custody
of a child can be considered such a res, and parents' rights and duties as respect
the custody of a child can be adjudicated in an action in which only constructive
service is had. For the court to have in rem jurisdiction, it is necessary only that
the child (or res) be domiciled within the state. See Sanders v. Sanders, 223 Mo.
App. 834, 14 S.W.2d 458 (Spr. 1929), in which the husband, a resident of Mis-
souri, returned to Missouri from Maryland and filed for divorce from his wife
who continued to reside in Maryland with the children of the marriage. The trial
court awarded custody to the father but this was reversed on appeal for lack of
jurisdiction over the children.
The L._ J_ court cited with approval Beckmann v. Beckmann, 358
Mo. 1029, 218 S.W.2d 566 (En Banc 1949). The husband in Beckmann temporarily
had left the state with the children of the marriage and was served by publica-
tion. The divorce decree awarded custody of the children and support to the
mother. The court held that the custody portion of the decree could stand be-
cause the court of the state where the child legally resided had jurisdiction to
determine custody. The Beckmann court also held that the support award could
not stand because of lack of personal jurisdiction over the father. See also Strutt-
mann v. Struttmann, 463 S.W.2d 600 (St. L. Mo. App. 1971)(court's statutory
power to make custody and maintenance provisions is incidental to dissolving
marital status). In Struttmann, both a divorce and custody were requested. Be-
cause the court denied the divorce, it had no power to award custody.
7. Krause, Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy v. Louisiana-
First Decision on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHi. L. Rxv. 338, 345
(1969).
8. 577 S.W.2d at 155.
9. 237 So. 2d 592 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
1980]
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case involved a paternity action brought under the Florida bastardy
statutes' 0 in which the mother had filed suit to have the defendant, a non-
resident of Florida, declared the father of her child. She had not asked for
support in that action. Summary judgment for the mother was entered after
the putative father, who had been served only by publication, failed to
enter an appearance. On the defendant's appeal from that judgment, the
court held that, in such an action, jurisdiction over the person of the pu-
tative father is essential because the sole purpose of a paternity proceeding
brought under the statute in question is to furnish a basis for compelling
support of the child." The Missouri Court of Appeals drew an analogy
between the paternity action in T.J.K. and the divorce proceeding in
L__A-J. It reasoned that if the question of custody was not considered,
the only purpose for a recital in the divorce decree that the children were
born of the marriage would be to compel the father to support the chil-
dren once personal jurisdiction could be obtained.12
The common law early imposed on a father the duty to support his
children born in wedlock.' 3 There is a strong presumption that a child
born during marriage is the product of that marriage.' 4 The use of the
words "children born of the marriage" or a similar phrase in a divorce
decree is really a statement of the common law presumption of legitimacy,
i.e., that the husband is the father of any children born or conceived dur-
ing the marriage relationship. This presumption, although described as
very strong,1 is rebuttable. During a divorce hearing based on personal
10. FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 742 (West 1964).
11. 237 So. 2d at 595.
12. 577 S.W.2d at 155-56.
13. Viertel v. Viertel, 212 Mo. 562, 576, 111 S.W. 579, 582 (1908). See gen-
erally Hoyne, Child Support in Missouri: The Father's Duty, The Child's Right
and The Mother's Ability to Enforce, 36 Mo. L. REv. 325 (1971). There is, in
addition to the common law duty, a statutory duty to support one's children.
Until 1968, this obligation of support applied only to fathers of legitimate chil-
dren. See note 39 infra. The relevant statutes are RSMo §§ 452.150, .340, and
568.040 (1978). Section 452.340 reads in part: "[T]he court may order either
or both parents owing a duty of support to a child of the marriage to pay an
amount reasonable or necessary for his support . . .after considering all relevant
factors including: (1) The father's primary responsibility for support of his
child .. " (Emphasis added.) This provision was construed in Mueller v. Jones,
583 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979), to provide that the primary responsibility
for support of an illegitimate child lies with the natural father.
Under RSMo § 568.040 (1978), the father's obligation of support can be en-
forced in a criminal proceeding. If the action is brought to enforce the duty of
support of an illegitimate child, the state must establish paternity as an element of
its case. State v. Tschirner, 504 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1973); State v.
Summers, 489 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1972).
14. Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10, 16-18 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969); T. v. T.,
447 S.W.2d 795 (St. L. Mo. App. 1969) (for presumption of legitimacy to exist,
the child must have been born or conceived during the period of marriage).
15. J.M.L. v. C.L., 536 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976) ("strong-
est presumption known to law"); Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10, 18 (K.C. Mo.
App. 1969) ("strong presumption of legitimacy"); Bernheimer v. First Nat'l Bank,
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jurisdiction, the wife in Boudinier v. Boudinier0 objected to evidence to
prove adultery because it also tended to dispute the legitimacy, or pa-
ternity, of the child. The appellate court held that the trial court erred
in sustaining the objection because legitimacy of a child born or con-
ceived during a marriage is rebuttable. The court also held that "clear and
convincing" evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption of le-
gitimacy.1 7 This is true whether the paternity of a child born during a
marriage is contested during the divorce proceeding or in a subsequent
action.' s Since the husband in L_.A__J , unlike the husband in Boudi-
nier, did not have the opportunity to rebut the presumption in the original
divorce action, he would be given the opportunity in the support hearing.1 9
The LA__J. court, however, cautioned that the fact the husband
would be given that opportunity did not imply that the evidence intro-
duced was sufficient to overcome the presumption.20
It is clear from the holding in L ..__A__ that a husband who, be-
cause of constructive service, has not had an opportunity to contest pa-
ternity in a divorce action may do so in a subsequent action. Even a hus-
band who has been personally served and who has appeared in the divorce
proceeding, however, may not have had an opportunity to contest pa-
ternity because the child was born after the divorce. If there is no mention
of the wife's pregnancy in the divorce decree, Missouri courts have allowed
the husband to contest the paternity in a subsequent support action.
In an early case, Laumeier v. Laumeier,2' the divorced husband
brought a declaratory judgment action against his ex-wife. The divorce de-
cree had been silent as to any childern born of the marriage. The hus-
band asked that either the court declare him to be the father of the child
born after the divorce and grant him custody, or that he be found not
to be the father and that his ex-wife and her child be enjoined from any
16. 240 Mo. App. 278, 203 S.W.2d 89 (K.C. 1947).
17. Id. at 294-95, 203 S.W.2d at 98-99.
18. The types of evidence that have been introduced to rebut the presump-
tion of legitimacy may be seen in S. v. S., 520 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975)
(evidence of husband's sterility was sufficient to overcome presumption of legiti-
macy); Rasco v. Rasco, 447 S.W.2d 10 (K.C. Mo. App. 1969) (evidence of blood
tests that husband probably was not the father insufficient to overcome presump-
tion of legitimacy). Generally, the courts seem reluctant to find the evidence suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy, since the result is to bastardize the
child whose paternity is in question. But see In re L, Part II, 499 S.W.2d 490 (Mo.
En Banc 1973). In that case the Missouri Supreme Court held that the testimony of
the husband and wife (plaintiffs) that the husband was not the father, although
they were living together at the time of conception and had two other children,
was sufficient to overcome the presumption of legitimacy and was indeed suf-
ficient evidence to support the finding that the defendant was the father of the
child in question. Id. at 493.
19. 577 S.W.2d at 156.
20. Id.
21. 308 Mo. 201, 271 S.W. 481 (En Banc 1925). See also State ex rel. Shoe-
maker v. Hall, 257 S.W. 1047 (Mo. En Banc 1923) (identical parties as Laumeier;
wife contested by a writ of prohibition the court's jurisdiction over her).
1980]
5
Goldstein: Goldstein: Children Born of the Marriage- Res Judicata Effect on Later Support Proceedings
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1980
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
further actions against him. In ruling that the declaratory judgment action
was a proper means to test paternity under the circumstances, the court
stated that if the wife "had filed a proceeding to modify the divorce de-
cree, so as to provide for the maintenance of the child, the defendant could
have contested her claim by denying the paternity of the child."22
The wife in JD v. MD23 brought an action to obtain support from her
husband for a child born after the divorce. The divorce had been granted
in January, 1967, after the couple had been separated for eighteen months.
The wife had alleged in the divorce petition and had stated at the hearing
that there was one child born of the marriage. After a second child was
born in August, 1967, the wife sought to obtain child support by a mo-
tion to modify. Although the wife, knowing she was pregnant, had testi-
fied at the divorce hearing that she had not "been with" her husband
since their separation in June, 1965, she was allowed to introduce evidence
at the support hearing in contradiction. The husband was given the op-
portunity to introduce evidence to rebut paternity.2 4 It was held that the
presumption of legitimacy still existed since the child had been conceived
prior to the divorce, so the evidence of non-paternity had to be "clear and
convincing," a burden the husband did not meet. Here the wife was not
bound by either her petition or her testimony in the divorce hearing. The
findings in this case are comparable to those in Lauineier and L__A_J.
in that the husband was given an opportunity to litigate paternity albeit
after the divorce had been granted.
If the husband has had an opportunity in the original action to con-
test paternity, the principle of res judicata usually will prevent him from
defending a subsequent support action by alleging non-paternity. The only
avenue open for such a husband who has concluded he is not the father
of a child born during his marriage seems to be to show extrinsic fraud.
This is a difficult task, since extrinsic fraud is defined to go to the power
of the court to hear the action, not to go to the merits of the claim. 25
22. 308 Mo. at 219, 271 S.W. at 486.
23. 453 S.W.2d 661 (Spr. Mo. App. 1970). See also Claude T. v. Claire T.,
579 S.W.2d 141 (Mo. App., E.D. 1979), where a child was born seven months after
the divorce. Evidence of an adulterous relationship at the time of the child's
conception and the husband's denial of marital relations were held sufficient to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy. Id. at 142.
24. 453 S.W.2d at 664-65.
25. In Jones v. Jones, 254 S.W.2d 260, 261 (St. L. Mo. App. 1953), the court
stated:
[Ejquity has jurisdiction to grant relief against a judgment upon the
ground of fraud in its procurement... so long as the complaining party
is able to show that he himself was free from fault, neglect, or inatten-
tion to the case .... [T]he fraud must have been extrinsic or collateral
to the matters which either were or could have been presented and ad-
judicated in the original proceeding, and not merely intrinsic in the
sense of having pertained to the merits of the cause upon which the
judgment of the court was rendered. . . .[R]elief is limited to those
instances where the fraud was of such a character as to have forestalled
an opportunity for the fair submission of the controversy.
[Vol. 45
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The husband in Martin v. Martin26 had been personally served and
had entered an appearance in the divorce action in which his wife had
alleged pregnancy. He later attempted to defend a garnishment proceeding
for support payments by denying paternity. First by a motion for coram
nobis and then by an action in equity to set aside the decree, he alleged
his wife had committed a fraud upon the court by falsely asserting his
paternity. The holding in both cases was that the decree could be set aside
only if the fraud went to the manner in which the judgment had been ob-
tained, not to the merits of the claim.27
That one court's intrinsic fraud may be another court's extrinsic fraud
is evidenced in Buford v. Buford.28 In that case the husband, who had been
personally served and who had entered an appearance by his attorney,
filed a motion within thirty days after entry to have the divorce decree
set aside for fraud. Contrary to an oral agreement, the wife had testified
that all four children involved were born of the marriage. The court held
that extrinsic fraud had been committed upon it and set aside the decree.
This type of fraud appears to be very similar to that in Martin, which
was held to be intrinsic fraud. Perhaps the crucial difference is that the
husband in Buford filed his motion before the judgment had become final.
A successful attack on a divorce decree may be made even after the
thirty-day post-judgment period if it can be shown that, although the
court actually lacked jurisdiction, a party's commission of extrinsic fraud
upon it had caused jurisdiction mistakenly to be taken. In Sigwerth v.
Sigwerth,29 the husband filed a motion to set aside the divorce decree
which had been based on constructive service. His motion alleged the falsity
of statements in the wife's petition, namely, that she had been a resident
of Missouri for the statutorily-required period and that she did not know
the husband's address. The appellate court held the decree to be void ab
znitio for want of jurisdiction. Although there were no children, it would
seem the same procedure could be followed if there were children born of
the marriage. If, in a subsequent support hearing, the husband could show
the court lacked jurisdiction for failure to meet residency requirements,
the entire decree could be stricken as a nullity. This would apply even if
the husband had been personally served. He would then be able to con-
test paternity when the court did have subject matter jurisdiction.
Without a showing of fraud upon the court, if paternity has been
made an issue in a divorce action, the parties will be bound by the court's
26. 549 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977) (motion for coram nobis to
set aside paternity portion of divorce decree for fraud); 561 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. App.,
D. St. L. 1977) (action in equity to set aside decree for fraud; previous motion for
coram nobis held to be res judicata).
27. 549 S.W.2d at 542; 561 S.W.2d at 397.
28. 433 S.W.2d 38 (K.C. Mo. App. 1968). See also F. v. F., 333 S.W.2d 320(St. L. Mo. App. 1960) (action by the husband to set aside the paternity portion
of the divorce decree for fraud based on the wife's allegedly false statements that
the child was born of the marriage; the husband's action was not allowed).
29. 299 S.W.2d 581 (Spr. Mo. App. 1957).
1980]
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determination. In Savage v. Purcell,80 the wife filed a common law suit
for past maintenance of her child who was born after the divorce. The
husband defended by denying paternity of the child and by alleging that
the divorce decree was res judicata on the issue of paternity. The husband
in Savage had been the petitioner for divorce and had made allegations in
his petition that his wife was pregnant with another man's child. The wife
was personally served but had defaulted. The court held that the divorce
decree, rendered on personal service, was conclusive as to all matters ad-
judicated as well as to all matters which could have been adjudicated, in-
cluding paternity of the child.31
Although the parties to the divorce action, if personally served, are
bound by the paternity implications or findings made in it, a third party
will not be. In L_. v. R_,2 the second husband brought an action against
his wife's first husband to have himself declared the father of one of the
children born during the wife's first marriage. The first husband asserted
as a defense that the second husband was collaterally estopped by the
recital in the divorce decree that the child was "born of the marriage." The
court held that the second husband was not bound by the recital. This
is readily explained on the basis that the second husband was not a party
in the divorce action and was not in legal privity, although he obviously
was in "social privity," with the wife.3 3 In the divorce proceeding which
was based on personal service, paternity of the children had not been an
issue. There had been custody and support awards which the appellate
court held to have been "incidental to the divorce decree."3 4 Since the
child whose paternity was being questioned was not a party to the divorce
action, a finding of paternity could not be binding on him.33 The court
also held that the mother, who alleged in her petition that the child was
born of the marriage, must be joined in the subsequent declaratory judg-
ment action of her second husband against her first husband, the pre-
sumptive father, to establish the second husband as the natural father
30. 9 S.W.2d 823 (Spr. Mo. App. 1928).
31. Id. at 824.
32. 518 S.W.2d 113 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1974). See also Annot., 78 A.L.R.3d
846 (1977).
33. 518 S.W.2d at 120.
34. Id. at 122, citing with approval A..._B_ v. CL-D , 150 Ind. App. 535,
552, 277 N.E.2d 599, 616 (1971) (refers to the paternity implications of a support
and custody award; the fact situation is very similar to that in L, v. R.).
See also State ex rel. Bentley v. Frenger, 158 Wash. 683, 291 P. 1089 (1930).
35. The holding that a child born during a marriage who is not made a
party is not bound by the paternity implications of his parents' divorce decree
may be important in inheritance cases. An example of this can be seen in Simp-
son v. Blackburn, 414 S.W.2d 795 (St. L. Mo. App. 1967). Mrs. Simpson traced
her claim to the Blackburn estate through her natural father, who had legiti-
mated her during his lifetime. The divorce decree of her mother and her presump-
tivc father had included the usual recital of "child born of the marriage." The
other heirs to the same estate attempted to defeat her claim by asserting the
divorce recital as a defense. The court held the daughter was not bound by the
recital since she had not been made a party to that divorce action. Id. at 804.
[Vol. 45
8
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 45, ss. 2 [1980], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol45/iss2/5
RECENT CASES
of one of the children born during her first marriage.3 6 Therefore, the
court apparently held that the wife also was not bound by the paternity
implications of the custody and support awards even though she had
filed for the divorce and had alleged the children were born of the mar-
riage. Although L_ v. R_ was decided before the Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act,37 the holding in that case should be applicable to cases arising
out of that Act. The L__A .__ court not only cited L_ v. R_ with
approval, but also stated that it "abhors any notion that the Dissolution
of Marriage Act makes all judicial pronouncements in the field of do-
mestic relations prior to its enactment passe."38
Since the 1968 Missouri Supreme Court decision in R. v. R.,39 a
father's obligation of support extends equally to children born in and
out of wedlock. It is clear from the reasoning and supportive authority in
LAJ that if an action is brought to establish paternity of an il-
legitimate child, personal service must be had on the putative father to
guarantee his opportunity to litigate paternity. Personal jurisdiction must
be had over the defendant whether only a declaration of paternity is
sought or, as is more common, an order of support is also sought.4 0
36. 518 S.W.2d at 126. The court held that joinder of the mother and the
child was mandated under Mo. Sup. CT. R. 52.04, which provides:
A person shall be joined if... in his absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or . . . is so situated that the dis-
position of the action in his absence may . . . leave any of the persons
already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring ... inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
Whether the child should be represented by his mother as next friend, which is
the usual case, must be determined. If the mother's sole interest in the action
is the support liability, she may not be the appropriate person to represent
the child's interest.
37. RSMo ch. 452 (1978) became effective January 1, 1974.
38. 577 S.W.2d at 154.
39. 431 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Mo. 1968). The Missouri Supreme Court held
that the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968), and Glona v. American Guar. Se Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968),
compelled its holding that the Missouri statutes relating to the rights and ob-
ligations of parents gave illegitimate children rights equal to those of legitimate
children to require support from their fathers. See also Krause, supra note 7.
40. State ex rel. Anonymous v. Murphy, 354 S.W.2d 42, 43 (K.C. Mo. App.
1962). A declaratory judgment action brought by two minor children against
their putative father to determine their parentage was dismissed for failure to
obtain personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Although this action had been
brought only to determine the legal relationship, the court reasoned that such a
determination would result in the defendant's personal liability for the children's
support. Id. at 44. In Howells v. McKibben, 281 N.W.2d 154 (Minn. 1979), the
court allowed the use of the Minnesota long-arm statute to obtain personal
JUrisdiction over the putative father on the basis of tort liability. Although the
child was alleged to have been conceived in Wisconsin, it was held that the de-
fendant, through numerous phone calls to and visits within Minnesota, and
the fact the child was born in Minnesota, had sufficient minimum contacts with
Minnesota such that a court of that state could take jurisdiction.
The court in Murphy also held that the declaratory judgment action is ap-
propriate for determining parentage. It is authorized by the Declaratory Judgment
Act, RSMo § 527.010 (1978), which provides: "The circuit courts of this state,
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